The Future of Nuclear Power: What Canada and France Can Learn From Each Other

Winter 2026 Applied Learning Project Reports, supervised by George Vegh

Nuclear Power in Canada
Article by: Arush Gaur, Hugo Kapteijn, and Marlo Scharf

Nuclear Power in France
Article by: Nargiz Shantayeva, Sophie Gaudreau, and Pavit Sidhu

Overview article below collaboratively authored by all project participants

Introduction

The turbulent history of nuclear power is on the eve of another twist. From an era of discovery and experimentation in the 40s and 50s, it transitioned into widespread deployment in the 60s and 70s. This initial boundless optimism associated with nuclear energy came to an unfortunate end in 1986 with the Chernobyl disaster. After years of ensuing stagnation, a second blow was dealt by the meltdown in Fukushima in 2011. For a while, it seemed that nuclear power would remain the black sheep of the energy landscape. Fortunately, it would not be resigned to this fate. Post-2015, the nuclear power industry experienced a renaissance prompted by a perfect storm. The climate goals set out in the 2016 Paris Accords, as well as heightened national climate ambitions from e.g. China, caused additional demand for low-carbon energy sources. Sharpened targets agreed upon in the following climate conferences exacerbated this effect. In 2022, The Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted heightened awareness of energy security and the value of energy independence. The recent war in the Middle East has further reinforced the desirability of energy sources that are not constricted by global fossil fuel markets. In light of these developments, the IEA projects a doubling of installed nuclear capacity by 2050 in its announced pledges scenario (IEA, 2025).

France and Canada represent two nuclear jurisdictions that are and will continue to be at the forefront of this nuclear renaissance. Both countries are committed to nuclear, although in different capacities and to different extents. With nuclear power contributing to 14% of Canadian final electricity consumption and 70% in France, it might not seem immediately necessary to compare the two. However, both countries are faced with challenges concerning the nuclear fuel chain, governance and finance, and the deployment of new technologies, among others. By comparing the two on the basis of extensive research, this article hopes to reveal opportunities for Canada and France by drawing on the experiences of their respective counterparts.

Canada’s Nuclear Landscape

Canada features several national strengths that support its ambitious nuclear sector. The country has significant uranium resources, an integrated and interprovincial fuel conversion chain, and longstanding expertise in nuclear reactor design and deployment. The distinctly Canadian CANDU reactor has been operating for the past several decades, but recent activities mark a shift towards nuclear innovation and growth in the country.

At present, 19 CANDU reactors exist across five facilities in Canada, which generate about 15% of the country’s electricity. Nuclear power has its most significant role in the province of Ontario, where all but one CANDU reactors operate to supply the province with 50% of its electricity. In March 2026, the Darlington refurbishment plan was completed ahead of schedule and under budget. This landmark event demonstrated that Canada can expertly originate complex nuclear infrastructure, and established Canada as a leader in nuclear development globally.

The first grid-scale small modular reactor (SMR) in the G7 is currently being constructed at  the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station in Ontario. This is the first of four planned BWRX-300 SMRs across several provinces, ultimately targeting national grid connection by 2030. Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta have all committed to SMR deployment, with various  projects moving through phases of design, planning, and construction. The Wesleyville and Bruce C large-reactor projects are key drivers of dramatic boosts in Canada’s electricity output and economic contributions.

Several structural challenges stand in the way of Canada’s nuclear ambitions. Canada lacks domestic uranium enrichment capacity and relies on its allied partners to supply it with usable uranium. This is a vulnerability that US-Canada trade tensions and global trade protectionism overall may exploit. Moreover, nuclear financing remains difficult to mobilize, and projected workforce shortages across several provinces will likely impact planned construction activity. There have been several instances of Indigenous consultation and environmental assessment being sacrificed in the rush to fast-track construction, which has generated community opposition to reactor projects. And, gaps remain in waste management policy that account for SMR-specific waste and transportation of waste to the new planned deep geological repository in Ignace, Ontario.

Altogether, Canada has tremendous momentum in the nuclear sector, supercharged by its resources, technology, and political will to become a global nuclear leader. However, execution risks around budget shortage, workforce limitations, and policy implementation have the potential to dampen Canada’s ability to deliver safe and secure infrastructure that benefits the Canadian population. The upcoming decade will be a defining period for Canada’s nuclear future.

France’s Nuclear Landscape

France’s energy system is the product of the 1974 Messmer Plan, which set the country on a nuclear trajectory. The 56 pressurized-water reactors built in the two decades that followed still provide roughly two-thirds of national electricity generation, making France the most nuclear-dependent large economy in the world. The institutional infrastructure that surrounds this fleet, spanning state-owned operator EDF, fuel cycle company Orano, and reactor manufacturer Framatome, remains intact and vertically integrated under state control.

France is now pursuing its most ambitious nuclear expansion since the original buildout. President Macron's February 2022 Belfort speech committed the country to six new EPR2 reactors by 2035, with an option for eight more, reversing a decade of phase-down signals. The third Multiannual Energy Programme (PPE3), published by decree in February 2026 after nearly three years of political paralysis, targets nuclear production of 380 to 420 TWh per year by 2030 to 2035. Alongside the EPR2 program, France is advancing the NUWARD small modular reactor, expanding its fuel cycle infrastructure at La Hague, Melox, and Tricastin, and constructing the Cigéo deep geological waste repository.

These ambitions confront significant obstacles. The EPR2 cost estimate has risen from €51.7 billion to
€72.8 billion before construction begins, echoing the Flamanville 3 experience, which came in at €23.7 billion all-in against an original budget of €3.3 billion and was delivered 12 years late. The PPE3's adoption by decree rather than parliamentary vote has triggered annulment challenges before the Conseil d'État, and the broader political environment remains fragile, with four governments collapsing in under two years. Climate change poses a growing operational threat, as heatwaves and droughts force reactor shutdowns due to cooling water constraints, with outages projected to triple or quadruple by 2050. Public support has rebounded, with 57% viewing nuclear as an asset, but 51% still incorrectly believe nuclear contributes significantly to CO2 emissions, suggesting the support is broad but not deep.

However, France's nuclear-dominated mix does provide insulation against fossil fuel price volatility. During both the 2022 gas crisis and the 2026 Iran-related energy shock, French wholesale electricity prices rose less sharply than in gas-dependent neighbours, reinforcing the energy security logic of the Messmer Plan. This dividend depends on fleet availability, which the 2022 corrosion crisis, when 32 of 56 reactors went offline simultaneously, showed cannot be taken for granted.

What Canada Can Learn from France

Despite being rather well-established as a trailblazer in nuclear power, Canada currently exists at an inflection point in nuclear energy. While being the first G7 country to build an SMR, the timelines are uncertain given capital cost uncertainties and energy crises driven by wars and trade tensions with the USA. France has long since developed standardized Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs) which can accelerate design standardization across provinces in Canada, reducing capital costs. Ontario Power Generation (OPG) and EDF are collaborating to evaluate the feasibility of deploying EDF's large-scale reactor technology in Canada.

Canada’s lack of uranium enrichment capacity is another weakness. Framing nuclear energy as a national energy security policy tool like France can be a good starting point to accelerate knowledge transfer and collaborations in enrichment. This also creates political consensus among other NATO members, especially during the Middle East conflict.

Financing new nuclear projects in Canada faces high capital costs, hence is poorly suited to deregulated electricity markets like Alberta. Canada can adopt a state-financing governance model like France’s EPR2 program.

Under the EPR2 program, EDF plans to build at least six large reactors at an estimated cost of €72.8 billion backed by state financing. The French model includes (i) subsidised government loans covering at least ~50% of construction costs, (ii) a 40-year Contract for Difference (CfD) that guarantees a stable electricity price, and (iii) explicit risk-sharing between the state and EDF. These mechanisms lower capital costs by reducing investor risk and ensuring predictable long-term revenues. In contrast, Canada’s more market-oriented or partially deregulated electricity systems (e.g., Alberta) expose nuclear projects to volatile wholesale prices, making it difficult to secure financing for assets with high upfront costs and payback periods spanning decades.

Total Canadian electricity generation is projected to double by 2050. If SMR costs don’t come down, we may see less nuclear generation by 2050 and other energy forms filling the gap. Canada is currently at risk of provincial fragmentation wrt nuclear co-operation, with Ontario pursuing the BWRX-300 and New Brunswick advancing the ARC-100. To achieve economies of scale like France, Canada needs legally binding, multi-province procurement agreements to build fleets of identical SMRs.

Because nuclear power drives about 70% of the French grid, their reactors can’t run at capacity round-the-clock. French PWRs are load following, hence can rapidly ramp their power output up or down (using control rods and coolant flow adjustments) to match demand fluctuations.

Canada's heavy-water CANDU reactors have a minute contribution to the grid, and operate at inflexible baseload power. However, with uptake of intermittent wind and solar, future large-scale reactors and SMRs deployed must be engineered with load-following capabilities to prevent the need for natural gas peaker plants.

Also, France operates a "closed" nuclear fuel cycle by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to manufacture Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel to be fed back into the reactor. This drastically reduces both the volume and the radiotoxicity of the final high-level waste that needs to be buried. Canada currently operates an "open" fuel cycle—spent fuel is cooled and slated for direct disposal in a Deep Geological Repository (DGR). Because traditional CANDU reactors use natural, unenriched uranium, reprocessing hasn't been economically necessary. However, as Canada deploys advanced Generation IV SMRs that use enriched fuels or produce novel waste streams, adopting aspects of the French reprocessing model could extend fuel resources and significantly reduce the burden on Canada's future DGR.

What France Can Learn from Canada

First, France's approach to environmental impact assessments for nuclear projects has created legal vulnerabilities that a more participatory model could avoid. The 2023 Nuclear Acceleration Act (Law No. 2023-491) explicitly shortened litigation timelines, streamlined environmental assessments, and separated nuclear permits from land development approvals (Fawaz & Noyalet, 2025; Gaster, 2025). Additional reforms in 2024 exempted nuclear projects from certain public procurement rules (Gaster, 2025). Environmental organizations, including the Ligue pour la Protection des Oiseaux and the Réseau Action Climat, criticized the legislation as a "parody of consultation" that "short-circuited" the environmental dialogue established since the Grenelle de l'environnement (Time News, 2022). In 2020, Greenpeace France had already challenged the extension of 32 reactor lifetimes without cross-border environmental impact assessments, invoking the Espoo Convention (European Parliament, 2023). The consequences of this approach materialized in December 2025, when the Lyon Administrative Court annulled Bugey EPR2 planning approvals on the grounds of insufficient environmental assessment (World Nuclear Association, 2026). By contrast, Canada's regulatory framework requires the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission to conduct in-depth public hearings and Indigenous consultation before approving nuclear projects. Although this process is slower, it produces decisions with stronger democratic legitimacy that are far less vulnerable to legal challenge. France could study this duty-to-consult model as it prepares siting decisions for the optional eight EPR2s, where locations remain undecided and local opposition is likely.

Second, reconsidering the regional distribution of costs and benefits could strengthen public support. All French nuclear policy decisions are made in Paris through a centralized architecture (CPN, DINN, EDF) that creates a disconnect between national ambitions and the communities hosting reactors. France's Commissions Locales d'Information (CLIs) exist to inform local populations, but they lack statutory decision-making authority comparable to Canadian provincial energy boards (Gaster,  2025;  ASNR, 2024). The consequences of this gap are visible in the data. 51% of French citizens incorrectly believe nuclear contributes to CO2 emissions, and local residents exhibit a "distancing from risk" rather than informed engagement (BVA & Orano, 2023; ASNR, 2024). Canada faces an analogous tension between western provinces that profit from fossil fuel production and eastern provinces that bear consumption costs. France's version of this tension plays out between national nuclear ambitions and local communities dealing with thermal discharge constraints, siting disputes, and the ongoing conflict over waste storage at Bure. Canada's experience in managing these interprovincial dynamics through a federal structure that distributes both political accountability and economic benefits offers a model for strengthening local governance around French nuclear sites.

Third, Ontario's approach to grid resilience offers a practical lesson. Unlike France, Ontario does not have deep interconnections with neighbouring grids and has therefore moved faster on distributed renewables and storage. France should not assume that interconnectors will always compensate for nuclear inflexibility. The 2022 crisis, when France became a net electricity importer for the first time in 40 years because 32 reactors were offline simultaneously, demonstrated that neighbouring countries cannot always absorb French shortfalls during continent-wide stress events (SFEN, 2026). Ontario's experience building resilience without the safety net of interconnection is instructive as France prepares for a grid that will rely on aging reactors well into the mid-2030s, though any expansion of storage capacity would also need to account for France's significant electricity export role in the European market.

Conclusion

Overall, both Canada and France exhibit path dependency in nuclear policy, but have arrived at it from opposite directions. France is deepening a wide existing nuclear base to eliminate its remaining fossil fuel exposure, having built this base over 50 years of industrial commitment, centralized governance, and an integrated fuel cycle that few nations can match. On the other hand, Canada’s nuclear capacity is geographically concentrated within a broader national energy system that still relies heavily on fossil fuels, with this capacity swiftly developing through SMR firsts and innovation ambitions.

An overarching lesson from such cross-examination is that Canada and France’s nuclear strategies are best conceptualised not as fundamental rivalry, but as complementarity. France's centralized, state-driven model, in which all nuclear decisions flow through the Élysée, contrasts with Canada's federal-provincial structure, where provinces choose their own energy mix while the federal government sets safety and environmental standards. France's 2023 Nuclear Acceleration Act weakened environmental impact assessments and community consultation to accelerate construction, producing legal vulnerabilities that Canada's more participatory regulatory model, with its emphasis on public hearings and Indigenous consultation, is designed to avoid. France benefits from deep integration into the European grid through interconnectors with six neighbouring countries, giving it a flexibility that Ontario, lacking comparable interconnections, has compensated for by moving faster on distributed renewables and storage. Both countries face the same underlying issue of committing to nuclear over 30- to 60-year horizons while the economics of solar, storage, and other alternatives continue to shift beneath them.

If Canada and France successfully implement the recommendations from the other’s expertise in areas outlined above, the result will be a mutual strengthening of resilience, legitimacy and reliability within their respective nuclear sectors. This means that their decisions’ effects will likely extend well beyond North America and Western Europe. Which technologies are backed, how they are financed, how transparently they are sited and regulated - all of this will serve as global proof-of-concept, shaping the decision of nuclear policymakers and investors worldwide. To sum up, Canada and France are less competitors in a zero-sum game, than two halves of an answer the international nuclear industry needs, holding the unique opportunity to define the world’s approach to this low-carbon source of energy